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Abstract
Companies typically select those projects that maximize their proﬁt as the primary criterion, within the limited budget at their
disposal. This criterion may lead to some company departments getting an exceedingly large share of the overall budget and
induce a negative perception of unfairness among the less favourite ones. We investigate how proﬁt optimization can be sought
after while achieving the desired level of fairness at the same time. Adopting a maximin approach to fairness and using an
Integer Linear Programming solver, we show that a linear trade-oﬀ is possible, since fairness and proﬁt exhibit a nearly perfect
linear anticorrelation. Fairness can be improved by even a relatively small reduction of proﬁt, especially in large companies (i.e.,
managing a large number of projects).
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1. Introduction
The budget allocation process determines how the (scarce) monetary resources devoted to investments into new
projects are distributed among projects within a company [1]. Though the allocation is concerned with individual
projects, the proposal of new projects and the subsequent money distribution are indeed carried out through the
organizational structures that make up the company (e.g., departments or divisions): it is the departments that actually
propose new projects to the company’s apical management, and it is departments that actually receive the money and
then manage it. Budget allocation (and the more general resource allocation) is a major issue in a company managing
a portfolio of projects [2].
However, proﬁt is not the only variable to consider when budget is allocated. An example of allocation in an
aerospace company using artiﬁcial intelligence programming and a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process following a num-
ber of tangible and intangible criteria is reported in [3]. In particular, as shown in several papers, fairness has an
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impact on commitment levels and business-unit-level outcomes [4, 5, 6]. The individual employees within a depart-
ment may feel frustrated and demotivated to work within a structure that is assigned only a thin slice of the budget
pie. A company is therefore expected to distribute its budget in such a way as not to have any department unsatisﬁed
and neglected due to budget allocation.
Fair allocation problems, such as that concerning the budget, arise naturally in various real-world contexts (math-
ematics, social choice, game theory and, more recently, computer science): resources are to be shared among several
self-interested parties (players or agents), so that each party receives his/her due share. At the same time, the resources
should be utilized in an eﬃcient way from a central point of view. A wide variety of fair allocation problems have
been addressed in the literature depending on the resources to be shared, the fairness criteria, the preferences of the
agents, and other aspects, to evaluate the quality of the allocation.
From a wider perspective, many authors have dealt with the problem of balancing global eﬃciency and fairness
either deﬁning appropriate models or designing suitable objective functions or determining trade-oﬀ solutions (see for
instance [7, 8, 9]). A recent survey of the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity in the operational research literature
is conducted in [10]. The issue of the interaction of fairness policies and proﬁt goals in a typical company setting is
instead yet to be fully addressed; some early results have been provided in [11].
In this paper, we examine the budget allocation problem in a company that wishes to maximize its proﬁt, but
also to achieve fairness among its departments at the same time. We wish to investigate if (as expected) and how the
fairness goal impacts on proﬁt. We adopt an exact proﬁt optimization procedure, imposing a threshold on the fairness
achieved, so that any department obtains at least a pre-set share of the overall budget.
Our conclusions are that, in all cases examined, proﬁt and fairness are linked by a nearly perfect linear anticor-
relation: proﬁt is traded oﬀ for fairness at a speciﬁc rate. The amount of proﬁt that has to be sacriﬁced for fairness,
however, appears quite limited, so that a fairer allocation policy can be safely adopted in place of a purely proﬁt-
maximizing one, with the trade-oﬀ being better for larger companies. In addition, raising the fairness threshold
progressively reduces the dispersion of fairness values: as we seek for greater fairness, we get a value of the fairness
index that is closer and closer to the threshold we have set, and independent of other conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. We deﬁne the budget allocation problem within a company in Section 2. In
Sections 3 and 4 we then describe our modelling assumptions and the simulation experiment we conduct to assess the
performance of budget allocation schemes in achieving fairness. The results of our experiments are ﬁnally reported in
Section 5.
2. The budget allocation problem
Let’s consider a company that has to allocate an overall budget B among its D departments. For the time being,
we assume that the departments have the same size. Loosely speaking, we mean that they have the same working
capacity and submit the same number of project proposals, which is N, so that the overall number of proposals under
consideration to receive a slice of the budget is D · N.
The j-th project ( j = 1 . . .N) of the i-th department (i = 1 . . .D) requires a budget S i j, which must be obtained in
full for the project to be undertaken. If all the proposals were to be accepted, the needed overall budget would be
Breq =
D∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
S i j > B, (1)
otherwise there would be no allocation problem, and all the proposals would be accepted.
The estimated return on the investment for the project with required budget S i j is given by Ri j ∈ (0,∞).
Since Breq > B, the company has to select a subset of the proposals submitted for funding. If we employ an
indicator variable Xi j, which is equal to 1 if the project is accepted and 0 otherwise, the budget allocated to the i-th
department is
B˜i =
N∑
j=1
Xi jS i j i = 1, . . . ,D, (2)
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and the overall allocated budget is
Ball =
D∑
i=1
B˜i =
D∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Xi jS i j, (3)
while the overall proﬁt (gain) for the company is
G =
D∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Xi jRi jS i j. (4)
An obvious constraint is that the company cannot allocate a budget larger than B, i.e.
D∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Xi jS i j ≤ B. (5)
Here we consider the budget allocation problem as the problem of selecting the proposals to be funded (which in
turn determine the amount of money to transfer to each department) with the goal of maximizing the overall proﬁt G
and the maximin index of fairness F, i.e.
maximize
Xi j
G =
D∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Xi jRi jS i j
maximize
Xi j
F = min
i
B˜i = min
i
N∑
j=1
Xi jS i j
(6)
It is to be noted that the maximum possible fairness value Fmax is determined by the number of departments, since
it corresponds to the case of perfect equipartition of the budget: i.e.
F ≤ Fmax = BD . (7)
Here we do not follow the bi-objective approach, but instead maximize the overall proﬁt while keeping the fairness
index above a predetermined threshold given by an appropriately chosen parameter value λ ∈ [0, 1]. The budget
allocation problem is therefore formulated as
maximize
Xi j
G =
D∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Xi jRi jS i j : F ≥ λ · BD , (8)
where the value λ = 0 represents the case where fairness is not considered in the allocation.
Since the two goals conﬂict with each other, we expect that in practice a trade-oﬀ will be sought. Our goal is to
explore the conﬂict between proﬁt and fairness and determine what degree of trade-oﬀ is achievable. In order to look
for the constrained optimization solution, we employ the Gurobi optimizer as an Integer Linear Programming (ILP)
solver.
3. Modelling assumptions
So far we have described the budget allocation problem without any reference to what represents the input for the
task at hand, i.e., the characteristics of the set of proposals submitted by the departments for funding. In this section,
we describe our modelling assumptions, which will be used in the simulation experiments described in the following
sections.
The characteristics of projects submitted to the company’s top management for funding may be essentially de-
scribed by two quantities: the size of the projects (here embodied by the amount of investment required) and the
316   Maurizio Naldi et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  100 ( 2016 )  313 – 320 
Case No. of departments (D) No. of projects per department (N)
C1 5 50
C2 5 100
C3 10 50
C4 10 100
Table 1. Cases considered in the simulation
expected proﬁt. As to the latter quantity, it may be alternatively described by the rate of return on the investment
(ROI), which, when multiplied by the amount of investment, gives us the proﬁt.
In this paper we assume that the individual project budgets can be considered as random variables drawn from a
lognormal distribution
P[S i j < x] =
1
σ
√
2π
∫ ln x
0
e−
1
2 (
y−μ
σ )dy (9)
This assumption has been validated through the analysis of more than 3000 projects spanning over a decade [12].
As to the rate of return, again we assume that the return is a random number, in this case drawn from a uniform
distribution, whose lower bound a reﬂects that assumption that only projects with an estimated return positive and
larger than a lower bound, e.g. the interest rate, are considered:
P[Ri j < y] =
y − a
b − a a ≤ y ≤ b. (10)
4. Simulation experiments
In order to investigate the performance of the constrained optimization procedure, we have conducted a number
of simulation experiments, following the modelling assumptions described in Section 3. As recalled in Section 2, we
have used Gurobi (www.gurobi.com) as an ILP solver. In this section we describe our experiments.
We have considered the cases reported in Table 1. For each case we have generated 1000 test instances, with each
instance consisting in a size and ROI value for each project submitted for funding. As described in Section 3, the size
is generated according to a lognormal model, with μ = 5.2 and σ = 1.35, as suggested in [12]. The ROI was set in the
[5%-30%] range. In all experiments the overall available budget was set as 30% of the required budget, as deﬁned in
Equation (1): the available budget was therefore diﬀerent for each instance.
Since the cases considered in Table 1 span over diﬀerent values for the number of departments, and the fairness
index depends on the number of departments, as shown in Equation (7), in order to compare the results for the four
cases on a level playing ﬁeld, in the following we consider the normalized fairness
F˜ =
F
Fmax
=
D · F
B
(11)
5. Proﬁt vs. Fairness
After having deﬁned the cases considered to examine the trade-oﬀ between proﬁt and fairness, in this section we
report the results. We ﬁrst consider the impact of λ on the fairness actually achieved.
For every instance of the simulation sample we obtain a diﬀerent proﬁt-fairness combination. However, the
constraint imposed on λ forces all the combinations into a limited area of the proﬁt-fairness space, such that F˜ > λ.
In Fig. 1 we show the scatterplots resulting from the proﬁt-fairness values for all the 1000 simulation instances in the
C3 case (similar plots are obtained for the other cases). The pictorial representation of the shift of the lower bound
on fairness is quite clear, but we also note that forcing the solution towards a higher fairness reduces the dispersion
of fairness values at the same time, as can be veriﬁed by looking at Table 2, where the standard deviation of fairness
reduces as we increase λ and drops dramatically when λ ≥ 0.5. Instead, we can see in the same table that the dispersion
of proﬁt values reduces only moderately when we push solutions towards a higher fairness.
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(d) λ = 0.75
Fig. 1. Proﬁt and Fairness in the C3 case
λ Fairness σ Proﬁt σ
0 0.139 567.7
0.25 0.115 565.5
0.5 0.040 539.3
0.75 0.005 483.6
Table 2. Dispersion of fairness in Case C3
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Fig. 2. Impact of the fairness threshold on the average fairness
Actually, we see that the minimum value of fairness is pushed up by the threshold λ, but what happens on the
average, since the values of fairness appear to be progressively ﬂattened on the threshold? In Fig. 2 we see that the
average fairness grows nonlinearly when we set a higher threshold. However, as already noted, when the threshold
gets quite high, the average fairness is practically equal to the threshold.
We can now examine the relationship between proﬁt and fairness. In Fig. 3 we see how the average proﬁt per
project (deﬁned as the overall proﬁt divided by the number of submitted projects) reduces when the company opts
for more fairness in the four cases of Table 1. The average proﬁt is obtained by dividing by the number of submitted
projects (rather than considering the proﬁt itself or the average proﬁt per approved project), to remove the inﬂuence
of the size of the company and compare all the cases on a level playing ﬁeld (companies with a larger number of
submitted projects and an associated higher available budget will typically have a larger overall proﬁt); it is to be
noted that here the number of submitted, rather than approved, projects is considered as a measure of the size of
the company. As can be seen, the average proﬁt per project (as deﬁned above) grows when the overall number of
projects grows, though the increase is quite limited: as the number of submitted projects grows from 5 × 50 = 250 to
10 × 100 = 1000 (i.e., fourfold), the average proﬁt moves in the [34.5-35.2] range, which means a change by a mere
2%. As to the exchange of proﬁt for fairness, just observing the curves tells us that they get steeper as the number of
projects grows, which is tantamount to saying that even a small loss in proﬁt may provide a large increase in fairness.
The relationship between proﬁt and fairness can be represented by the incremental ratio E (the ratio of the change in
fairness to the corresponding change in proﬁt divided by the number of submitted projects), which acts as an exchange
rate:
E =
ΔF˜
Δ GND
(12)
This quantity gives us a precise indication of how much proﬁt we have to sacriﬁce to improve fairness. Higher values
of E correspond to a better trade-oﬀ, since large improvements in fairness can be achieved at the expense of a small
sacriﬁce in proﬁt. The results in Table 3 conﬁrm that the trade-oﬀ improves as the number of projects grows (i.e., for
larger companies). The diﬀerences in the results between cases C2 and C3 show that, for the same overall number of
projects, the trade-oﬀ is better when projects are concentrated in the hands of fewer departments.
In all cases, the relationship between proﬁt and fairness is nearly linear. The linear correlation coeﬃcient between
proﬁt and fairness for the four cases is reported in Table 4. It takes absolute values in excess of 0.98 in three cases
out of four (and a very large absolute value of nearly 0.98 in the C3 case): proﬁt and fairness exhibit a nearly perfect
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Fig. 3. Fairness-Proﬁt trade-oﬀ
Case No. of projects E
C1 250 0.689
C2 500 1.198
C3 500 0.925
C4 1000 1.752
Table 3. Exchange of proﬁt for fairness
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Case Proﬁt-Fairness correlation
C1 -0.9972
C2 -0.9984
C3 -0.9789
C4 -0.9841
Table 4. Correlation between proﬁt and fairness
linear anticorrelation.
6. Conclusions
The possibility of achieving fairness in budget allocation to departments within a company has been explored con-
sidering a maximin approach to fairness and an integer linear programming solver to maximize proﬁt. The relationship
between proﬁt and fairness exhibits a nearly perfect anticorrelation: proﬁt is exchanged linearly for fairness. The rate
at which the trade-oﬀ takes place increases as the size of the company grows, so that in larger companies a smaller
reduction in proﬁt is needed to achieve a greater fairness. The trade-oﬀ is achieved by tuning the fairness threshold in
the constraint adopted when performing proﬁt optimization, but the relationship between the threshold and the average
fairness is strongly nonlinear. A good degree of fairness can therefore be obtained without signiﬁcantly sacriﬁcing
proﬁt.
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